Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
This picture shows cells of an animal that died of inhalational
anthrax, an infectious disease that can be transmitted to humans by
handling infected products.
By Kiyoshi Tomono
Daily Bruin Contributor
Nestled off one of the long corridors of UCLA’s Center for
the Health Sciences, Dr. Scott Layne’s sparsely decorated
office looks more like a modest-sized broom closet than a Pentagon
war room.
But for the last few years, that is where Layne, an associate
professor of epidemiology in the School of Public Health, has been
plotting the logistics for a large-scale molecular biology
laboratory capable of thwarting a bioterrorism attack.
While the mainstream media has scrambled to define how a
bioterrorist attack might be pulled off in the wake of the Sept. 11
attacks, Layne said a smarter approach lies in using biotechnology
to prevent one from occurring in the first place.
“A few kilograms of this (biological) material is the size
of a few milk cartons and you could obtain that by many
means,” Layne said. “The immature questions are: how is
this going to happen “¦ or can this ever happen ““ who
cares? The real question is what are we going to do about
it?”
In a recent article titled “Public-health preparedness for
biological terrorism in the USA” in the medical journal
“The Lancet,” a rundown of the chief biological
suspects to be used in a bioterroristist attack read much like an
FBI’s Most Wanted list.
Agents that cause diseases like the plague, anthrax and smallpox
topped the inventory for their high mortality rate and easy
transport.
According to the Lancet article, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention researchers called for enough small pox vaccine in its
initial plan to immunize a quarter of the United States population
and enough antibiotics to treat 10 million people infected with
anthrax on both coasts for six weeks.
But identifying which agent a terrorist has used, especially
when those agents have multiple and sometimes drug-resistant
strains, may be half the battle, Layne said.
As evidence of how difficult identification of a disease-causing
agent can be, Layne pointed to a recent case in Ohio where about
three people came down with meningococcus due to natural
causes.
In the ensuing panic, Layne said, about 20,000 people visited
the hospital to receive antibiotics while another 18,000 received a
vaccine before the particular strain could even be identified.
“By the time those decisions were made, they hadn’t
done the laboratory analysis to know if the strain was
vaccine-resistant or not,” Layne said.
Layne said that for every 100 people infected, 10 representative
samples would have to be analyzed ““ and analyzed quickly.
“As of now, there is no laboratory in the country that has
that capability,” he said.
In several of his research papers, symposiums, and in a
graduate-level class that Layne teaches each spring titled
“Public Health Responses to Bioterrorism,” he has
pushed his vision for a multi-million dollar laboratory capable of
providing such results.
Following a biological terrorist attack, the lab could be called
upon to isolate, prepare and fingerprint the particular agent used
in the attack from hundreds, if not thousands of samples, to use as
a response agent or to identify attackers.
In its lull time, Layne said the lab could be used as a resource
to track and rapidly identify the different strains of diseases
that currently afflict Americans, like tuberculosis and
influenza.
“As soon as we’ve gotten and fingerprinted their
samples through national security programs, we can go back to these
various terrorist leaders and say, “˜if your strain ever shows
up in the wrong place, and we’re not going to tell you how we
know ““ you may not be very happy when the sun rises on your
capital,'” Layne said. “It gives us
teeth.”
High-tech or not, Layne’s vision for a large-scale lab has
yet to become a reality. With a price tag of several million
dollars, Layne said there are no governmental grants large enough
to fund such a laboratory. There haven’t been any takers in
terms of foundations or private companies either.
In the meantime, Peter Katona, an assistant clinical professor
of infectious diseases, said Los Angeles County has been focusing
on a smaller, organized system that could do for the city during a
terrorist attack what Layne’s lab could do for a larger
attack on the nation.
“People are being educated, the proper people who need to
be involved are getting prepped, and the proper facilities are
being put together for testing and stockpiling,” said Katona,
who has been working as an adviser on bioterrorism for the past few
years.
“Most of us thought it would happen regardless, but the
new issues of the last two weeks make us think it could happen
sooner than we thought,” he said.
Katona, who also serves as a consultant to the L.A. County
Department of Health Services on bioterrorism preparations, said
panic, and not disease, might be the greatest factor if a
bioterrorist attack occurs.
“The more you worry and alter your lifestyle, the more the
terrorists are able to force you to do exactly what they want you
to do,” he said.