Dan Papia claims that a unilateral United States invasion of
Iraq will flush the United Nations Charter down the toilet
(Viewpoint, Oct. 16).
Since the vast majority of wars are unilateral (I can think of
only Korea, Gulf War and Somalia actions as being U.N.-sponsored)
one must ask why so many people think a similarly unilateral
U.S./U.K. war is going to damage the U.N. in a way that previous
wars have not. The U.S. unilateral invasion of Panama and
subsequent regime change did no lasting damage to the U.N. Charter,
and Panama was not even violating all the U.N. Security Council
resolutions like Iraq.
The 1998 war in Yugoslavia was at first not approved by the
Security Council because of Russian and Chinese veto power. Yet,
far from harming the U.N., this unilateral NATO war actually
strengthened the U.N. in the long run by hastening the capture of
accused war criminals, including Slobodan Milosevic who is
currently on trial at the U.N. court in the Hague. So, if recent
precedent is any indication, going after Saddam for defying U.N.
resolutions on disarmament would similarly enhance U.N. credibility
by sending a message to dictators that ignoring its resolutions can
have serious consequences.
On the other hand, failure to go to war with Iraq could
seriously damage U.N. credibility. It was the world
community’s failure to act against Mussolini that was the
final nail in the coffin for the League of Nations. Now
Russia’s defense minister is suggesting if U.N. inspectors do
not find any evidence of banned weapons in Iraq within two months,
they should certify Iraq as being in full compliance, and all
sanctions and no-fly zones should be lifted. How seriously would
anyone take the U.N. in the future if his advice were followed?
Papia also puts forward the popular domino theory that if the
U.S. unilaterally goes to war against Iraq, other nations will
follow suit. For example India may decide to invade Pakistan
because it also possesses weapons of mass destruction. Again, what
historical precedent backs up this assertion?
The Soviet Union unilaterally invaded Afghanistan two decades
ago. How many copycat wars did that inspire? And the 2001 campaign
in Afghanistan was a U.S., not a U.N. war. Should we have avoided
attacking the Taliban for fear of setting a precedent of
unilateralism that others would follow? India and Pakistan have
already fought three wars, and the cost of a fourth to both
countries would be the same whether or not the U.S. attacks Iraq.
Neither country is going to put its citizens’ lives and
economy at risk simply because the U.S. did it first.
Attacking Iraq comes with considerable risks: dead and wounded
soldiers and civilians, damage to Iraqi infrastructure,
destabilization of the region, worldwide economic disruption, and
cost to U.S. taxpayers of $50-200 billion. But these costs must be
weighed against the potential benefits: an end to the economic
sanctions that have harmed the Iraqi people for the last decade
(allegedly killing 100,000 per year, which is more than would
likely be killed in a war), departure of U.S. troops from Saudi
Arabian soil, and an end to Saddam’s human rights
atrocities.
If one considers the risks of war, one must also consider the
risks of peace. Failure to attack Iraq now simply prolongs the
cat-and-mouse game of Saddam versus the impotent weapons
inspectors. A failure would continue the uncertainty in world
financial markets, and give Saddam more time to build chemical and
biological weapons.
So far, I have heard anti-war activists talk at length about oil
greed, using war to distract voters from the dismal economy before
the November elections, and America’s isolation from the rest
of the world. But neither Papia nor the others have much to say
when it comes to proposing a viable and detailed alternate path of
peace that will bring us any closer to solving the Iraq problem.
You can fault Bush’s plan, but unlike his detractors, at
least he has a plan.