As U.S. forces triumphantly rolled through the streets of
Baghdad on April 10, the spokesman of the North Korean foreign
ministry issued a quiet statement of concession: North Korea
“will not stick to any particular dialogue format.”
Apparently, after witnessing the United States’ victory in
Baghdad, North Korea is suddenly more willing to compromise with
Bush’s preference of multilateral talks.
Critics of the Bush administration’s policy toward North
Korea have argued for the United States to agree to the North
Korean regimes’ preference of bilateral talks. However,
Pyongyang’s insistence on bilateral talks with the United
States to settle the dispute was clearly meant to extract
concessions like food, oil and a non invasion pledge. Such an
insistence would have been equivalent to nuclear blackmail, and the
U.S. administration was right to ignore such a threat.
Although there is no direct proof that the North Korean
government was influenced by witnessing the United States dismantle
the similarly repressive and cruel regime of Iraq, it must have
taken notice of the unilateral resolve and actions of the Bush
administration in dealing with Saddam Hussein.
The rapid action in Iraq has shown North Korea that the United
States will not hesitate, even in the face of world opposition, to
eliminate threats to the United States posed by dictators with
suspected weapons of mass destruction.
Although the Bush administration’s pre-emptive doctrine
has been frequently criticized for a variety of reasons including
creating a bad precedent, the potential impact of the doctrine in
North Korea may, interestingly enough, preclude further military
actions. By showing overwhelming force with unflinching
determination to implement the new U.S. strategic doctrine, the
Bush administration can use the tool of diplomacy more effectively.
Fear can, and apparently has, induced changes in behavior from
hostile governments.
The choice of tackling Iraq before North Korea has strengthened
the United States’ negotiating position. Now with throngs of
Iraqis celebrating in the streets of Baghdad and the success of the
Bush administration in convincing Russia and China to join talks,
Pyongyang feels increasingly isolated.
If these initial steps eventually lead to peaceful dismantling
of existing nuclear weapons and prevention of further proliferation
of such weapons on the peninsula at a more reasonable cost, the
Bush administration’s hard line deserves much of the
credit.
John Ly is a fourth-year political science and history
student.