Fifty-four percent of the electorate voted to recall Gov. Davis.
Clearly, they held him accountable for the California budget
fiasco. The spectacle of a legislature unable to confront hard
choices or act on a timely basis ““ and a governor unable to
coax it to do so ““ led to Davis’ political demise and
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s victory.
But the difficulty remains; it is the Legislature that must
enact a budget under our current system. The governor can only make
a proposal. That arrangement needs to change. The new governor, and
all future governors, need more budgetary authority since the
voters look to the state’s chief executive for fiscal
leadership.
Under current procedures, the governor submits a tentative
budget to the Legislature in January for the next fiscal year. In
May, armed with more recent data, the governor submits a revised
budget. The Legislature is supposed to pass the budget in time for
the start of the fiscal year on July 1. But when tough decisions
are required, it is unable to act.
Last year, for example, no budget was passed until early
September, creating a legal limbo and doubts on Wall Street about
California’s fiscal agenda. This year, the budget was over a
month late and is widely viewed as a house of cards, dependent on
revenues that may not materialize and bond issues that may be
illegal.
So here is a simple reform, albeit one that would require a
constitutional amendment: If no budget has been enacted by July 1
of any fiscal year, the governor’s “May revise”
budget would become the state budget until such time as an
alternative is enacted. There would then be no legal issues about
whether the state could pay its bills since a budget would be in
place. And, if the governor’s budget proposals were fiscally
responsible, whatever deficit financing might be needed would be
available from a reassured Wall Street.
Moreover, the likelihood that a governor would be more fiscally
responsible would be enhanced since pressure to compromise with the
Legislature would be reduced. For example, Gov. Davis’
January 2003 budget plan was much tighter than the actual budget
that finally emerged in August.
Of course, this reform would substantially increase the power of
the governor. Members of the Legislature would know that if they
dawdled, or if they proposed a budget the governor would veto, the
governor’s own budget would become law. Some legislators
might be tempted to remain intransigent in order to please a
particular interest group. But others might see the benefit of
having an influence on the final budgetary product.
In any event, any future governor would have substantial
leverage in obtaining approval for his or her budget proposal,
either through legislation or by default. And the voters clearly
want a chief executive they can hold accountable. Under a procedure
entailing such perils and rewards, the governor would surely be
more accountable.
Mitchell is a professor at the Anderson School at UCLA and
the School of Public Policy and Social Research.